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Washington Constitution Article 1, Section 7:
The Argument for Broader Protection
Against Employer Drug Testing
Ken Davis *
I.

INTRODUCTION

As the United States Supreme Court further restricts the
civil liberties of individuals through its denial of protection
under the United States Constitution, the supreme courts of
various states, including Washington, have increasingly been
called on to re-extend these liberties through their own constitutions.1 One example of this restriction of individual rights is
reflected in the recent United States Supreme Court Fourth
Amendment decisions regarding employer drug testing of
employees without a basis of individualized suspicion of drug
use.2 In these decisions, the Court continues to erode the privacy rights of employees against drug testing by adopting a
restrictive interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. State
courts, in response, should attempt to protect these rights
through an independent interpretation of their analogous
search and seizure provisions.
To date, the Washington Supreme Court has yet to decide
whether random drug testing in the absence of individualized
* B.A. 1989, Whitman College; J.D. 1992 cum laude, University of Puget Sound
School of Law; Associate, Preston Thorgrimson Shidler Gates & Ellis, Seattle,
Washington.
1. See, e.g., Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 445 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983) (finding
state constitutional right to solicit signatures in shopping mall); State v. Schmid, 423
A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 100 (1982) (finding state constitutional
right to distribute political literature on private university); State v. Boland, 115 Wash.
2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990) (finding state constitutional privacy right in garbage placed
outside home for collection); Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988)
(holding sobriety checkpoints violative of state constitutional privacy right).
2. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
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suspicion is constitutionally sound.3 The issue is ripe for
review. The historical basis of the Washington constitutional
provision and recently established precedent provide a sound
foundation for the Washington court to rule that the Washington Constitution grants greater protection from employer drug
testing than its federal counterpart.
This Comment will analyze Article 1, Section 7 of the
Washington Constitution, the search and seizure provision, and
conclude that this provision should be construed to provide
greater protection to employees against employer drug testing
absent individualized suspicion than the Fourth Amendment
does. The scope of this Comment, however, is limited to the
rights of state employees with respect to suspicionless drug
testing. The rights of federal employees are not included in
this analysis because they are protected against suspicionless
drug testing only by the Fourth Amendment, not by the analogous Washington provision. Moreover, Article 1, Section 7, like
the Fourth Amendment, only protects individuals against state
action, not private action.4 Thus, the drug testing programs
that are germane to the topic of this Comment are those mandated by state government. The scope of this Comment is also
limited to employer drug testing of employees after the creation of the employer-employee relationship. That is, this Comment does not specifically address the issue of the
constitutionality of pre-employment drug testing as a part of
the employee screening process.
Section II briefly summarizes current Fourth Amendment
doctrine as to bodily searches not based on individualized suspicion and then presents the most recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court on employer drug testing. Section III discusses the Washington Supreme Court's evolving
interpretation of Article 1, Section 7, the Washington Constitution's analogous provision to the Fourth Amendment. From
this discussion, Section III concludes that the constitutional
3. The question of the extent of protection offered by WASH. CoNsT. art. 1, § 7
against mandatory drug testing was presented to the court in Alverado v. Washington

Public Power Supply System, 111 Wash. 2d 424, 759 P.2d 427 (1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1004 (1989). The court ruled, however, that state law (and thus the Washington
Constitution) was preempted by federal law because the drug testing regulations in

question were promulgated by a federally regulated nuclear power plant. Id. at 436-37,
759 P.2d at 433-34.
4. See Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 113

Wash. 2d 413, 427-29, 780 P.2d 1282, 1289-90 (1989) (closing the door on the possibility
that non-state action would be covered under the Washington Constitution).
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history, contemporary Washington precedent, and particular
privacy issues implicated by drug testing support increased protection under the Washington Constitution. Finally, Section
IV explores how other states have interpreted their state constitutions with respect to drug testing issues, but concludes
that this precedent provides little guidance for the Washington
Supreme Court.
II.

CURRENT FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS: SKINNER, VON
RAAB, AND THE DEMISE OF THE INDIVIDUALIZED
SUSPICION REQUIREMENT

The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.5
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as to bodily searches
not based on individualized suspicion has undergone a thorough transformation under the reign of the Rehnquist court.
Until recently, probable cause has been a prerequisite for a
full-scale search, whether the search was conducted under the
authority of a warrant or under one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. 6 Thus, under the Fourth
Amendment, individualized suspicion was a fundamental prerequisite to a bodily search by the government.7 This requirement had been lifted only with respect to prison inmates.8
5. U.S. CONST. amend.

IV.

6. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 637-38 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
7. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 358 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8. Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60, (1979)). Furthermore, the
established exception for administrative searches did not entirely dispense with the
requirement of individualized suspicion. Although it has been stated that the
requirements for an administrative search may be less onerous, see CHARLES H.
WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBAG, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

ch. 13 (2d ed. 1986), such

a search still requires either the existence of reasonable grounds to believe that an
administrative violation occurred, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978), or
that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an inspection
exist. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967). Arguably, the
administrative search exception does not completely abolish the requirement of
individualized suspicion because there must still be shown a special need for the search
based on well-known or well-demonstrated evils within that field, with well-known or
well-demonstrated consequences. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
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However, as a result of two 1989 United States Supreme
Court cases decided on the same day, Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n 9 and National Treasury Employees
0 the requirement of individualized suspiUnion v. Von Raab,"
cion to conduct a valid search under the Fourth Amendment
seems to have fallen by the wayside. A brief synopsis of these
two cases will provide an introduction to current Fourth
Amendment doctrine and a brief overview of the current status of the Fourth Amendment as applied to drug testing absent
individualized suspicion of drug use.
In Skinner, the Court found that the Fourth Amendment
was not violated by Federal Railroad Administration regulations providing for mandatory testing of employees involved
with serious on the job accidents, or so called "post-accident"
testing." Although the tests in question would be administered only after a resulting accident, this program did not
require a basis of individualized suspicion because tests were to
be made without evidence that the particular employee to be
tested was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time
of the accident.' 2 The Court found, however, evidence which
indicated that alcohol and drug abuse by railroad employees
had previously contributed to a number of significant train
accidents.' 3 Thus, although the urinalysis required to administer the test was held to be a search for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects only against those searches and seizures that are
deemed to be unreasonable. 4 In so finding, the Court applied
the test for reasonableness, which requires a balancing of the
individual's Fourth Amendment interest in a reasonable expectation of privacy" against the government's interest in con489 U.S. 656, 684 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Furthermore, these standards
governing the administrative search exception are not binding on the Washington
court. In Washington, it is apparent that, even with respect to an administrative
search, some form of individualized suspicion is required. See Jacobsen v. Seattle, 98
Wash. 2d 668, 658 P.2d 653 (1983) and infra text accompanying notes 123-27. See also
Robert F. Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law, 9 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 1 (1985).
9. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
10. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
11. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.
12. Id. at 609.
13. Id. at 608.
14. Id. at 619.
15. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978). Thus, the Court will look to the
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ducting the search.
Specifically, the Court found that "special needs" such as
public safety may justify departure from the normal requirements of a warrant and probable cause.' 7 With respect to the
railroad's drug testing program, the Court found that employees working in these types of safety-sensitive positions have a
diminished expectation of privacy. The government interest,
however, to deter drug use in these positions and ensure public
safety, was found to be compelling.'" Therefore, the Court
upheld the testing program without addressing the individualized suspicion requirement. 9
The Court came to a similar conclusion in Skinner's sister
case, Von Raab.2" There, the Court considered the validity of
the United States Customs Service drug testing program.2 ' In
contrast to Skinner, Von Raab goes considerably further
toward the elimination of the requirement of individualized
suspicion.2 First, the testing conducted in Von Raab was for
employees seeking employment, transfer, or promotion within
the agency, and the testing was not merely conducted after the
occurrence of a serious accident, as in Skinner.2" Second, there
was no evidence of a history of drug or alcohol abuse among
the employees of the Customs Service, as there was among the
railroad employees in Skinner.24 Despite these differences, 5
the Court nevertheless held that the government interest in
testing and ensuring that drug users are not promoted within
the agency, thereby adding to the safety of the borders and to
the integrity of the agency, was sufficiently compelling to validate the search in the absence of individualized suspicion.2 6
Thus, after Skinner and Von Raab, the United States
Supreme Court no longer requires under the Fourth Amendindividual's expectation of privacy despite the fact that privacy is not explicitly
mentioned in the text of the Fourth Amendment.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
Id, at 619-20.
Id. at 627-30.
Id at 634.
Id. at 656.

21. Id at 678-79.
22. Because of the differences between the two cases, Justices Scalia and Stevens,
who voted with the majority in Skinner, voiced a vigorous dissent in Von Raab.

23. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660-61.
24. Id. at 660.
25. These differences
dissenting).

26. Id. at 678-79.

are

articulated

in

the dissent.

Id.

at 689 (Scalia, J.,
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ment that the government suspect a particular individual of

drug or alcohol abuse before testing for these substances. As
long as the government can show that its need to search outweighs the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, the
search will be upheld. Significantly, the government's required
showing is not particularly onerous, as neither a history of past
drug or alcohol related incidents within the industry nor an
incident in a particular case are prerequisites to a valid search.
III. THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 7

A.

Under Gunwall, an Independent Interpretationof Article
1, Section 7 is Appropriate With Respect to the Issue
of Drug Testing

Any inquiry regarding the protection of individual rights
does not end with an analysis of the federal Constitution. It is
a well-established principle that, while the United States Constitution provides the floor of protection of an individual's
rights, states are free to expand these rights through an
independent interpretation of their own state constitutions.2 7
Washington has been among those states that have looked to
their own state constitutions to decide constitutional issues. As
one Washington Supreme Court justice has commented:
Washington is one of many states that rely on their own constitutions to protect civil liberties. Since the recent
retrenchment of the United State Supreme Court in this
area, the appellate courts of a majority of the states have
interpreted their state constitutions to provide greater protection for individual rights than does the United States
28
Constitution.
Possibly the most developed area of independent Washington constitutional jurisprudence is with respect to Article 1,
Section 7, the search and seizure provision.'
This provision
provides that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private
27. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); see also William J.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.

REV. 489 (1977).
28. Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System" Perspectiveson
State Constitutionsand the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 491, 499 (1984) [hereinafter Utter, Freedom and Diversity]. Justice Utter has also

stated that "It]he Washington Declaration of Rights [Article 1] is the primary
guarantor of the rights of Washingtonians." Id. at 524.
29. Id. at 500-502.

1993]

Employer Drug Testing

1341

affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law. '30 It is
only recently that the Washington Supreme Court has
breathed new life into Article 1, Section 7 by interpreting it
independently of the Fourth Amendment. 3 1 The resurrection
of Article 1, Section 7 by the Washington Supreme Court correlates to the continued contraction of Fourth Amendment
rights by the United States Supreme Court that began in the
1 9 70s. 2
Two questions still remain, however, with respect to this
provision. First, does Article 1, Section 7 provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment? Second, if it is appropriate to proceed with an independent state constitutional
analysis, how is the provision to be applied to the issue of drug
testing absent a basis of individualized suspicion of drug use?
Faced with the recurring dilemma of whether it is appropriate to embark on the uncharted journey of adopting an
independent state constitutional analysis, the Washington
Supreme Court in State v. Gunwal133 established a series of
tests to determine whether the ship of independent interpretation should set sail.3 The Gunwall court delineated six "nonexclusive neutral criterion" to determine whether a provision
of the Washington State Constitution should be considered as
extending broader rights to its citizens than the United States
Constitution: (1) the textual language of the state constitutional provisions; (2) differences in the texts of the federal and
state constitutions; (3) the constitutional history of the Washington provision in question; (4) pre-existing Washington law
at the time the provision was adopted: (5) structural differences between the federal and state constitutions; and (6)
whether the provision touches on matters of particular state or
local concern.' Thus, the first inquiry in a Washington consti30. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7.

31. George R. Nock, Seizing Opportunity,Searchingfor Theory: Article 1, Section
7, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 331, 333 (1985).
32. Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and Gustafson v.
Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) as examples of this contraction).
33. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
34. The -unwall court noted that set criteria to determine whether an
independent state constitutional

analysis is appropriate

will provide a safeguard

against result-oriented decisions, constitution shopping, and courts acting as superlegislatures. I& at 60, 720 P.2d at 811. Thus, these factors ensure that an independent
constitutional interpretation be "articulable, reasonable and reasoned." Id at 63, 720
P.2d at 813.
35. Id. at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812-13.
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tutional analysis is whether, under the Gunwall criterion,
resort to an independent state constitutional analysis is appropriate with respect to the issue involved. If so, the the second
inquiry is how should the state constitutional provision be
applied. 6
Initially, it should be noted that the analysis concerning
the first, second, third, and fifth Gunwall criteria remain constant with respect to different issues implicating the same state
constitutional provision. 7 These four Gunwall criteria as
applied to Article 1, Section 7 have already been addressed by
the Gunwall court itself.-8 Although the Gunwall court held
that each of these four criteria support an independent state
constitutional analysis of Section 7,39 this Comment will nevertheless analyze each criterion separately to provide a complete
analysis of Article 1, Section 7.
1.

Textual Language

Under the first Gunwall criterion, the state court will
examine the textual language of the state constitutional provision.4" Article 1, Section 7 provides that "[n]o person shall be
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law."' 4 ' The Washington Supreme Court has noted
that this provision focuses on the protection of a citizen's private affairs.' Thus, the "relevant inquiry for determining
when a search has occurred is whether the State unreasonably
The court
intruded into the defendant's 'private affairs.'
of
the
phrase
has also had occasion to interpret the meaning
"authority of law" in Article 1, Section 7. This term may
include authority granted by statute, common law, or a rule of
the court, and may include search warrants or subpoenas.4 4
Given the court's expansive reading of the "authority of
",43

36. Id at 67, 720 P.2d at 815.

37. State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 576, 800 P.2d 1112, 1114 (1990).
38. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 65-67, 720 P.2d at 814-15.
39. Id at 61, 720 P.2d at 812.
40. Id.at 65, 720 P.2d at 814.
41. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
42. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 65, 720 P.2d at 814.
43. Id.at 65, 720 P.2d at 814 (quoting State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 510, 688
P.2d 151, 153-54 (1984)).
44. Id, at 68-69, 720 P.2d at 816; State v. Fields, 85 Wash. 2d 126, 530 P.2d 284
(1985). However, the exact meaning of "authority of law" has yet to be fully explored
by the court. Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 462, 755 P.2d 775, 779 (1988)
(Dolliver, J., concurring).
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law" clause, this section appears to be self-defeating. The literal reading of Article, Section 7 would suggest that any search
conducted pursuant to a warrant, statute, or other "authority
of law" would constitutionally validate the act.4 5 Interpreted
in this way, Article 1, Section 7 would essentially preclude
judicial review of any legislative act that impinged on a citizen's right of privacy. Such a result is illogical. First, this
interpretation of Section 7 would contradict the central purpose of a state constitution: to act as a restriction on the otherwise plenary power of the state. Under such a literal
interpretation, Article 1, Section 7 would hardly serve as any
real limitation on a state's power. Second, evidence of the historical basis of Article 1, Section 7 suggests that a literal interpretation is inappropriate. 6
Two other interpretations of the phrase "without authority of law" are more plausible. First, the "authority of law"
referred to in Section 7 refers to the common law requirement
of a warrant based on probable cause, as in the Fourth Amendment.47 Alternatively, "authority of law" refers to those principles of property law that were intertwined with the
nineteenth century conception of a right to privacy.4 8 In either
case, it is apparent that the court has rejected a literalist
approach given that it has reviewed and invalidated government promulgated rules for violating Article 1, Section 7.49
2.

Differences Between Federal and State Provisions

Under the second Gunwall criterion, the state court will
analyze significant differences in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and state constitutions."° It is readily
apparent that the wording of the Article 1, Section 7 and the
Fourth Amendment are radically divergent.5 1 Whereas the
Washington Constitution contains an express protection of an
individual's "private affairs," the Fourth Amendment contains
no such privacy wording.5 2 The Washington Supreme Court
45. Nock, supra note 31, at 346-52.
46. See infra part III.A.3.
47. See Sanford E. Pitler, The Origin and Development of Washington's
Independent Exclusionary Rule: Constitutional Right and Constitutionally Compelled
Remedy, 61 WASH. L. REV. 459, 516-25 (1986).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988).
50. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 61, 720 P.2d at 812.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 5 and 41.
52. State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 510-11, 688 P.2d 151, 153-54 (1984).
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has noted that the differences between the wording of Article
1, Section 7 and the Fourth Amendment support a distinct
interpretation of the Washington provision.5 3
3.

Constitutional and Common Law History

Under the third Gunwall criterion, the state court will
evaluate the state constitutional and common law history of
the provision in question.' In this inquiry, the Washington
Supreme Court has held that the history of Article 1, Section 7
supports an interpretation independent of federal law.5 5 As
the court has noted: "It suffices to observe that in 1889, our
State Constitutional Convention specifically rejected a proposal
to adopt language identical to that of the Fourth Amendment,
before adopting Const. art. 1, § 7 in its present form."' Unfortunately, there is little direct contemporaneous evidence of
what the framers intended by the wording of Article 1, Section
7 57

The question therefore remains, if the Fourth Amendment
is not the source of the wording of Article 1, Section 7, then
what is the source of the provision? Surely the words did not
originate from the framers' imaginations absent any external
influence. This question is important not only for determining
whether an independent constitutional analysis is appropriate,
but also for applying the provision to the particular issue of
drug testing.
Relevant to an examination of the state constitutional history of Article 1, Section 7, as required by the third Gunwall
criterion, an analysis of the prevailing political ideologies of
the time can shed light on the framers' intent. This analysis is
especially relevant to the drafting of the Washington Constitution because much of the Washington Constitution has been
58
traced to the direct influence of nineteenth century populism.
53. See, e.g., Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1988); State v. Chrisman, 100
Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199
(1980).
54. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 65-66, 720 P.2d at 812.
55. Id. at 65-66, 720 P.2d at 814-15.
56. Id. at 65-66, 720 P.2d at 814 (citing THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889, 497 (Beverly P. Rosenow ed., 1962) [hereinafter
1889 JOURNAL]).
57. See 1889 JOURNAL,supra note 56.

58. Robert F. Utter, The Right to Speak, Write, and Publish Freely; State
Constitutional Protection Against Private Abridgement, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
157, 178-79 (1984) [hereinafter Utter, The Right to Speak].
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The fundamental tenets of the populists, who arose in an
era of government corruption and railroad monopolies, were a
distrust for government and large corporations and a promotion of labor interests.5 9 The influence of populist ideology on
the wording of the Washington Constitution was inevitable
because a large number of the delegates to the state constitu6
tional convention were supporters of the populist movement. 0
These tenets were chronicled during the state constitutional
convention. For example, one delegate proposed a provision
protecting the health of those employed in mines and factories.6 ' This proposal eventually was adopted as Article 2, Section 35.1 Another delegate proposed a provision to make
unlawful the importation of armed detectives into the state
because they had previously been employed to quiet labor
strikes.6" Many of these concerns with corporate exploitation
of labor are embodied in Article 12. Thus, under the third
Gunwall criterion, the unique ideological context of the Washington Constitution supports an independent analysis of Article 1, Section 7 from the Fourth Amendment.
The framers' concerns are directly relevant to an analysis
of the constitutionality of employer drug testing absent an
individualized suspicion of drug use. The framers expressed a
fear that corporations would abuse their control over their
employees, and they wished to protect individuals' personal,
political, and economic rights.' The framers sought to restrict
corporate power to indiscriminately disregard employee
rights.6 5 Of course, the specific issue of employee drug testing
was not within the ambit of the framers' imagination; however,
there is little doubt that precisely this type of intrusion on an
59. See James Leonard Fitts, The Washington Constitutional Convention of 1889,
8-10 (1951) (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Washington).
60. Id.
61. Utter, The Right to Speak, supra note 58, at 179 (citing TACOMA DAILY
LEDGER, July 12, 1889, at 4).
62. "The legislature shall pass necessary laws for the protection of persons
working in mines, factories and other employments dangerous to life or deleterious to
health; and fix pains and penalties for the enforcement of the same." WASH. CONST.

art. 2, § 35.
63. Utter, The Right to Speak, supra note 58, at 179 (citing TACOMA DAILY

LEDGER, July 16, 1889, at 4).
64. See Utter, Freedom and Diversity,supra note 28; Robert F. Utter & Sanford E.
Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument" Comment on Theory and
Technique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635 (1987) [hereinafter Utter & Pitler, Presenting a
ConstitutionalArgument].
65. Fitts, supra note 59, at 9.
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employee's rights was of foremost importance in the framers'
minds. The history of the populist movement, influential in
the writing of the Washington Constitution, suggests that Article 1, Section 7 should be interpreted to extend broader rights
to Washington citizens under Gunwall.
Furthermore, in examining the constitutional history as
required by Gunwall, a United States Supreme Court opinion
delivered shortly before the drafting of the Washington Constitution supports an independent analysis of Article 1, Section 7.
From this era of the populist movement came the United
States Supreme Court case of Boyd v. United States." The
drafting of Article 1, Section 7 was heavily influenced by
Boyd,617 the first significant Fourth Amendment case to reach
the Supreme Court." The Boyd Court interpreted the Fourth
Amendment in light of the nineteenth century conception of
property rights and the rights of an individual to the "privacies
of life" against unlawful government action.69 Thus, under
Boyd, the Constitution allows an invasion of an individual's privacy only if such an invasion is consistent with the rules of
property law.7 0 This is consistent with the fact that, by 1886,
the time of the Boyd decision, American courts and legislatures
had already legally recognized an individual's right to privacy
in a number of contexts. 7' The scope of this nineteenth century privacy protection has been described as "any physical
' 72
trespass against the person or into the sanctity of the home.
Thus, the original intent of the framers of the Washington
Constitution in protecting "private affairs" was to constitutionalize the scope of those privacy rights described in Boyd.
Thus, the third Gunwall criterion, the state constitutional
66. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
67. This theory is espoused in Pitler, supra note 47, at 516-25 (1986). It has also
been noted that the Oregon Constitution served as a model for the Washington
Declaration of Rights, and the Oregon Constitution was, in turn, largely influenced by
the Indiana Constitution. See 1889 JOURNAL, supra note 56, at 497 n.13.
68. Pitler, supra note 47, at 520 n.318.

69. Id at 520. The Boyd court held that the forced disclosure of papers to be used
as criminal evidence violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Thus, the papers

were held inadmissible at Boyd's trial. The Court reasoned that both the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments provided a broad right of personal privacy.
70. Id. at 521 n.320.
71. Id. at 521 (citing Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America,
94 HARv. L. REv. 1892, 1893-94 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Nineteenth Century
America]).

72. Id. at 521 n.320 (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (C.P.
1765)).
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and common law history of Article 1, Section 7, supports an
independent state constitutional analysis. First, the framers'
special interest in protecting the rights of labor against
exploitation by business is evident in the Washington Constitution. Second, Boyd, the contemporaneous United States
Supreme Court case, is indicative that Article 1, Section 7, as
originally conceived, was intended to grant a broad protection
of privacy to Washington citizens.
4.

Pre-existing State Law

Under the fourth Gunwall criterion, a state court will
evaluate pre-existing state law to determine if resort to a state
constitutional analysis independent of the federal constitution
is appropriate.7" This criterion is difficult to apply to the issue
of drug testing because drug testing is only a recent development in the workplace. However, an analysis of the common
law that existed in the Territory of Washington as to warrantless and arbitrary searches and seizures is nonetheless relevant. As will be extensively discussed, the existing common
law required at least some degree of individualized suspicion to
74
conduct a search.
5.

Differences in Structure

Under the fifth Gunwall criterion, the state court will consider the structural differences between the federal and state
constitutions.7 5 The Washington Supreme Court has noted
that the United States Constitution functions as a grant of limited power to the federal government while the state constitution acts as a limitation on the otherwise plenary powers of the
state.7 6 This distinction between the separate and independent
roles of the federal and state governments was noted by James
Madison:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external
objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce;
with which last the power of taxation will, for the most Sec73. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812.
74. See iqfra text accompanying notes 99-110.
75. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 62, 720 P.2d at 812.
76. Id. at 66, 720 P.2d at 815.
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tion, be connected. The powers reserved to the several
States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties
of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State.77
Thus, the difference in functions of the two constitutions supports an interpretation of Article 1, Section 7 distinct from that
of the Fourth Amendment.78
6.

State Interest or Local Concern

Finally, under the sixth Gunwall criterion, the state court
will consider whether the matter is of particular state or local
concern. 79 With respect to drug testing, the privacy of employees in government or government regulated positions satisfies
this criterion. Washington has been especially zealous in protecting its citizens' privacy rights.8 0 Hence, the court has recognized that the right of a Washington citizen to privacy is an
8
issue of particular interest to this state. '
Furthermore, in evaluating the sixth Gunwall criterion,
the Washington Supreme Court has found it relevant that
other states have found a privacy interest based on independent state grounds.8 2 Where other states resort to their own
constitutions to determine whether their citizens have found
such a right of privacy, the Washington Supreme Court has
noted that the issue is more likely to be particularly of local,
and not only national, concern. 3 As will be discussed in Section IV of this Comment, some states have looked to their own
77. The Federalist No. 45, at 303 (James Madison) (Bicentennial ed., 1976).
78. Further justification for the Gunwall court's use of the difference in structure
between the federal and state constitutions in analyzing whether an independent state
constitutional analysis is appropriate is found in McCollough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,
400-37 (1819), where Chief Justice Marshall relied on the structures and relationships
set up by the Constitution in resolving constitutional issues.
79. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 62, 720 P.2d at 813.
80. See, e.g., State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 578, 800 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1990)
(holding privacy interest in curbside garbage protected under Article 1, Section 7);
Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 458, 755 P.2d 775, 777 (1988) (holding suspicionless
automobile checkpoint stops unconstitutional under Article 1, Section 7); Jacobsen v.
Seattle, 98 Wash. 2d 668, 674, 658 P.2d 653, 656 (1983) (holding suspicionless pat down
searches of rock concert patrons unconstitutional under Article 1, Section 7).
81. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d at 576-77, 800 P.2d at 1115.
82. Id. at 577, 800 P.2d at 1115. Thus, the fact that some other jurisdictions might
have come to a contrary result and held that such a privacy interest did not exist does
not necessarily preclude the Washington Supreme Court from holding that the issue is
one of local concern under the sixth Gunwall criterion.
83. See, e.g., Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112.
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state constitutions to resolve the issue of employee drug
testing.84
In addition, Article 1, Section 32 of the Washington Constitution provides that "[a] frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles is essential to the security of individual rights and
the perpetuity of free government. 8 s5 Hence, the Washington
Constitution itself indicates the state's particular interest in
protecting the civil rights of its citizens.'
8 7
As noted, the six Gunwali criteria are "non-exclusive. 1
The court leaves the inquiry open to consider other determinative criteria. Another factor that supports an interpretation of
Article 1, Section 7 independent of that of the Fourth Amendment with respect to the issue of drug testing is the fact that
different standards under the state and federal constitutions
will not obscure the status of the law in an adverse manner.
For instance, the maintenance of a separate state doctrine
under Article 1, Section 7 concerning issues of the ability of
police to conduct searches has drawn criticism as hampering
the police by making the status of the law uncertain.. However, the adoption of a separate state analysis concerning drug
testing would not have such an adverse social impact.
Thus, the six Gunwall criteria, as applied to an Article 1,
Section 7 analysis of drug testing absent individualized suspicion of drug use, support an interpretation of the Washington
constitutional provision that is broader than that of the Fourth
Amendment.
B.

The History of Article 1, Section 7 Supports Protection of
Employees Against Drug Testing Absent a Basis of
Individualized Suspicion

Application of the six Gunwall criteria supports an evaluation of the scope of Article 1, Section 7 independent of federal
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Once the Gunwall criteria
84. See infra part IV.

85. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 32.
86. See also WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 30, which provides that "[t]he enumeration in
this Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny others retained by the
people." Justice Utter has pointed to Sections 30 and 32 as evidence that the voters
who ratified the constitution must have intended that fundamental principles not
expressly stated in the constitution itself would be incorporated to ensure individual
rights. Utter, Freedom and Diversity, supra note 28, at 512.
87. See supra text accompanying note 35.

88. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d at 593, 800 P.2d at 1123 (Guy, J., dissenting).
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have been fulfilled, however, the question still remains of how
to interpret the scope of protection afforded by the state constitutional provision and, specifically, whether it protects
employees against drug testing absent a basis of individualized
suspicion.
A threshold issue is whether Article 1, Section 7 applies to
employee drug testing.8 9 Article 1, Section 7 protects the "private affairs" of its citizens." The Washington Supreme Court
has held that a citizen's private affairs do not lose their status
as private simply because the person is in a public place. 91 The
right of sanctity in one's private affairs stretches to wherever
the individual has the right to be.92 The Washington Supreme
Court has not yet considered whether the giving of a urine
sample constitutes a "private affair" protected by Article 1,
Section 7. However, it appears that when confronted with the
question, the court will find a urinalysis to be a "private
93

affair."

An important interpretational tool in construing the scope
of a constitutional provision is the history surrounding the
adoption of the provision. 1 This history clearly supports a
reading of Article 1, Section 7 as providing greater privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment.
The current wording of Article 1, Section 7 is identical to
the provision adopted by the Washington State Constitutional
Convention in 1889. 9" The constitutional convention rejected a
89. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that a drug test in the

workplace is a search protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) and discussion supra text accompanying
notes 9-19. Further, it is equally settled that the Fourth Amendment provides
protection in most commercial premises. Marshal v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311
(1978).
90. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7. See supra text accompanying note 52.

91. State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 187-88, 203 P. 390, 396, (1922), quoted in State
v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 700-01, 674 P.2d 1240, 1248 (1983).
92. Id.
93. The highly intrusive nature of a typical urinalysis is discussed infra part III.D.

The Washington Supreme Court has held that other searches, undoubtedly less
intrusive than a urinalysis, are protected "private affairs" under Article 1, Section 7.

See, e.g., State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 578, 800 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1990) (holding
trash set at curbside for pickup protected by Article 1, Section 7); State v. Meachum, 93
Wash. 2d 735, 612 P.2d 795 (1980) (holding blood drawing protected by Article 1,
Section 7).

Furthermore, other state courts that have addressed the issue have

unanimously held that a urinalysis implicates a constitutional right under their
respective state constitutions. See infra part IV.
94. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 690, 674 P.2d 1240, 1243 (1990).
95. Id. (citing 1889 JOURNAL, supra note 56, at 497).
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proposal that contained language identical to the Fourth
Amendment.' The Washington Supreme Court has acknowledged that there is a lack of evidence to provide insight concerning the specific intent of the framers or the voters who
ratified the constitution when they chose the language of Article 1, Section 7.
However, as discussed previously, the language of Article 1, Section 7 was most probably based on those
"privacies of life" protected by United States v. Boyd.9"
Also relevant in determining the framers' intent are similar prohibitions against searches and seizures that were in
effect in the Washington Territory at the time the state constitution was adopted. 9 Those prohibitions also argue for greater
protection of Washington citizens under Article 1, Section 7.
These common law principles are directly relevant in
determining the scope of the Washington provision because
Article 1, Section 7 "is declaratory of the common-law right of
the citizen not to be subjected to search or seizure without
warrant."1 " This principle follows from Article 27, Section 2
of the Washington Constitution, which states that "[alll laws
now in force in the Territory of Washington, which are not
repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain in force until they
expire by their own limitation, or are altered or repealed by
the legislature.. .. ""
The Washington Supreme Court has construed the fundamental common law search and seizure principles in existence
at the time of the ratification of the Washington Constitution
as providing more extensive protection than the Fourth
Amendment. The court summarized these common law principles as follows:
[Elvery official interference with individual liberty and
security is unlawful unless justified by some existing and
specific statutory or common law rule; any search of private
property will similarly be a trespass and illegal unless some
recognized lawful authority for it can be produced; in gen96. Id.
97. lId Unlike some other state constitutional provisions, there is also a lack of
contemporaneous newspaper reports to shed light on the meaning of Article 1, Section
7.
98. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See supra text accompanying notes 66-72.
99. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 690, 674 P.2d 1240, 1243 (1983).
100. State v. McCollum, 17 Wash. 2d 85, 96, 136 P.2d 165, 170 (1943) (Millard, J.,
dissenting), quoted in Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 691, 674 P.2d at 1243.
101. WASH. CONST. art. 27, § 2.
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eral, coercion should only be brought to bear on individuals
and their property at the instance of regular judicial officers
acting in accordance with established and known rules of
law, and not by executive officers acting in their discretion;
and finally it is the law, whether common law or statute,
and not a plea of public interest or an allegation of state
necessity that will justify acts normally illegal.'" 2
Thus, a few basic points concerning the common law principles of search and seizure can be distilled from this passage.
First, searches that interfered with one's privacy were unlawful absent valid legal authority. Second, and most important,
an invasion of an individual's privacy cannot be maintained
merely on the basis of the public or state interest alone. This
concept is of paramount importance with respect to the issue of
drug testing because the common justification for such programs is that they are validated by a substantial state
interest. 0 3
At common law, individualized suspicion was required for
a valid search. For example, the Washington Supreme Court
has noted that, at the time the state constitution was adopted,
no statutory provisions authorized warrantless arrests.-l 4 Even
common law exceptions to the warrant requirement did not
dispose of the requirement of individualized suspicion. For
example, officials could make warrantless arrests where a
crime was committed in their presence or where probable
cause existed that a felony had been committed. 10 5 Also, a
warrant was not required where the search was made incident
to a lawful arrest."° Thus, each of these common law exceptions to the warrant requirement maintained an essential
degree of individualized suspicion to conduct a search. It
would be problematic to fit a drug testing program that tested
persons without a basis of individualized suspicion into one of
102. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 691, 674 P.2d at 1243 (quoting POLYViOS G. POLYVIOU,

SEARCH & SEIZURE 9 (1982) (summarizing Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng.Rep. 807 (KB
1765)). Entick is claimed to be a primary source of the United States Supreme Court
opinion in Boyd, which in turn had a large influence on the wording of Article 1,
Section 7. See supra text accompanying notes 66-72.
103. Neither is it likely that this state interest could constitute "authority of law"
to validate the search under Article 1, Section 7.
104. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 691, 674 P.2d at 1243.
105. Id (citing 1 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 193
(1883); THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 232 (3d ed. 1898); 1 SIR
MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 587 (1st Am. ed. 1847) (1st ed. London 1736)).

106. Id. at 692, 674 P.2d at 1244 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392
(1914)).
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these common law exceptions. 10 7
Consistent with these common law prohibitions, Article 1,
Section 7 "poses an almost absolute bar to warrantless arrests,
searches, and seizures, with only limited exceptions ....
Any exceptions to the requirement of a warrant "must be 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and must be strictly confined to the
necessities of the situation."'" Those seeking the exemption
have the burden of showing that a situation's exigencies made
the search imperative."10 Thus, pre-existing Washington common law prohibitions against warrantless and suspicionless
searches argue that Article 1, Section 7 should be interpreted
to protect employees against random suspicionless drug testing.
C. ContemporaryArticle 1, Section 7 Analysis Requires at
Least a Basis of Individualized Suspicion to
Validate a Search
There remains a problem, however, in applying the intent
of the framers of the Washington Constitution in construing
Article 1, Section 7 to the issue of random employee drug testing absent individualized suspicion of drug use. Specifically,
the question of employee drug testing was assuredly not within
the consideration of the framers who drafted the constitution.
Furthermore, there were no laws that pre-dated the constitution that concerned the topic of drug testing. However, as the
Washington Supreme Court has noted, "[c]onstitutions are
designed to endure through the years, and constitutional provisions should be interpreted to meet and cover changing conditions of social and economic life.""' Thus, a relevant inquiry is
whether other Washington cases dealing with search and
seizure and privacy issues can shed light on the scope of constitutional protection with respect to employee drug testing.
107. This does not mean that under the Washington Constitution there is an
absolute bar to searches not based on individualized suspicion. An example of a search
that might be permitted is an x-ray scanning of luggage at airports. However, these
searches should be distinguished because the invasion of privacy involved does not
approach the invasion of privacy that results from a drug testing urinalysis.
108. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 691, 674 P.2d at 1243.
109. Id. at 700, 674 P.2d at 1248 (citing State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143, 149, 622
P.2d 1218, 1222 (1980)).
110. Id. at 702, 674 P.2d at 1249.
111. State ex rel. LUnn v. Super. Ct., 20 Wash. 2d 138, 145, 146 P.2d 543, 547 (1944).
Also, constitutions should not be treated as embodying static concepts, but should be
treated as an organic document consistent with current values. Utter, Freedom and
Diversity, supra note 28, at 522.
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Contemporary Washington case analysis suggests that
Article 1, Section 7 provides greater protection to employees
against random, suspicionless drug testing than the Fourth
Amendment. The Washington Supreme Court has been highly
skeptical of searches not based on individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing. The Washington Supreme Court has also repeatedly pointed to the fact that the explicit provision in Article 1,
Section 7 protecting the "private affairs" of its citizens justifies
2
a greater privacy protection under the state constitution."1
1.

General, Suspicionless Searches are Disfavored by the
Washington Supreme Court

First, the Washington Supreme Court has suggested that
searches not based on individualized suspicion should be conducted only in the rarest of circumstances. A "general search"
is one made in the absence of individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing."' A general search is "anathema" to Article 1,
Section 7, and "except for the most compelling situations,
should not be countenanced.""' 4
The Washington Supreme Court demonstrated its aversion
15 In Mesiani, the
to general searches in Seattle v. Mesiani."
court invalidated a sobriety checkpoint program that stopped
all oncoming motorists at stops established during the holiday
season." 6 The police stopped all motorists without warrants or
any basis of individualized suspicion. 1 7 The court held that
this practice was unconstitutional under Article 1, Section 7.118
The court conceded that the state interest in protecting the
public against the danger of drunk drivers was great; however,
this interest was held not justified when balanced against the
invasion of an individual's right of privacy under Article 1, Section 7.119
The Mesiani court further distinguished this case from a
lower-court decision which held that a roadblock to catch a
fleeing felon was constitutional. 120 The court noted that, in the
112. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.

113. Kuehn v. Renton School Dist., 103 Wash. 2d 594, 599, 694 P.2d 1078, 1081
(1985).
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 601-02, 694 P.2d at 1082.
110 Wash. 2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988).
Id. at 460, 755 P.2d at 778.
Id, at 455, 755 P.2d at 776.
Id. at 460, 755 P.2d at 778.
Id. at 456, 755 P.2d at 777.
Id at 458 n.1, 755 P.2d at 777 n.1.
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fleeing felon situation, there was reliable information that a
felony had recently been committed.12 1 The court stated, however, that such information is far different from a statistical
inference that there are inebriated drivers in the area. 12 2 Thus,
Mesiani demonstrates that the Washington Supreme Court is
highly averse to general searches. Further, Mesiani shows that
the Washington Supreme Court is committed to the requirement of individualized suspicion as a prerequisite to a valid
search under Article 1, Section 7.
A similar principle precipitates from Jacobsen v. Seattle.'2 3
In Jacobsen, the court held that routine, warrantless pat-down
searches of patrons at rock concerts as a condition of admission
violated Article 1, Section 7.124 The searches involved were
"administrative" in nature and were not in furtherance of a
criminal investigation. 1 25 The court determined that the patdowns of concert-goers did not fall under one of the federally
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement and thus
were unconstitutional. 1 26 The court found persuasive the fact
that there were other methods, such as greater surveillance,
121. Id.
122. Id. (contrasting State v. Silvernail, 25 Wash. App. 185, 605 P.2d 1279 (1980)).
123. 98 Wash. 2d 668, 658 P.2d 653 (1983).
124. Id. at 674, 658 P.2d at 656.
125. Thus, these searches resemble employer drug tests in that they fall under the
category of "administrative" searches. An administrative search is a search conducted
pursuant to a government administrative inspection program. See, e.g., Camera v.
Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 525 (1967).
Although the United States Supreme Court has held that there may be a lower
standard of probable cause in an administrative, as opposed to a criminal search, see
supra note 8, Jacobsen and Mesiani suggest that such a lowered standard with respect
to an administrative search is inappropriate under a Washington constitutional
analysis. Furthermore, drug testing programs can be distinguished from the typical
administrative search in that, under the Fourth Amendment, no warrant need be
obtained to conduct a drug test, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602 (1989), whereas a warrant is required to conduct an administrative search.
Camera, 387 U.S. 523.
126. Jacobsen, 98 Wash. 2d at 674, 658 P.2d at 656. The federal exceptions to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment are consensual searches, Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), stop and frisk searches, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), hot pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), border searches, United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), and airport and courthouse searches,
Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972); see Gaioni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10,
13 n.10 (N.D. Ala. 1978).
It should be noted that the court at this point inappropriately equates an Article 1,
Section 7 analysis with a Fourth Amendment analysis. Article 1, Section 7 of the
Washington Constitution does not have an explicit warrant requirement; rather, there
is a less exacting requirement of "authority of law." See supra text accompanying
notes 40-49.
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that could be employed to substantially fulfill the government
interest of safety at the concerts. l 7
The principles set forth in Mesiani and Jacobsen should
protect employees from employer drug testing absent a basis of
individualized suspicion of drug use. The state interest frequently set forth to justify a drug testing program-public
safety-is identical to the state interest claimed to justify the
suspicionless stops in Mesiani. However, the privacy interests
implicated in an urinalysis connected with a drug test are far
greater than that of an automobile stop or a pat down search.
Thus, the invasion of private affairs is even more unreasonable in the case of a drug test absent individualized suspicion than an automobile checkpoint, as in Mesiani, or a patdown search, as in Jacobsen. With respect to the balancing
between the state interest and issues of privacy involved, the
state interest used to justify the search in the case of drug testing and in the case of automobile checkpoints is similar; the
privacy issues implicated by drug testing, however, are much
more severe. If the balancing scale is tipped in favor of privacy
in the automobile checkpoint case, Mesiani, the scale should
weigh even more heavily in the case of drug testing. Hence, an
employer drug testing program without a basis of individualized suspicion of drug use violates Article 1, Section 7.
2.

The Washington Supreme Court Has Held that the
Protection of One's "Private Affairs" Under the
Washington Constitution Affords Greater
Privacy Protection than the
Fourth Amendment

As has been previously discussed, the language of Article
1, Section 7 is substantially different from that of the Fourth
Amendment in that the Washington provision explicitly protects the "private affairs" of its citizens. 2 ' Thus, the Washington Supreme Court has concluded that the relevant inquiry
under the Washington Constitution is not whether there exists
a legitimate expectation of privacy, as under the Fourth
Amendment, but whether the state unreasonably intruded into
the defendant's "private affairs. ' 1 9 As the Washington
127.
128.
129.
Myrick,

Jacobsen, 98 Wash. 2d at 675, 658 P.2d at 657.
See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 580, 800 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1990); State v.
102 Wash. 2d 506, 510-11, 688 P.2d 151, 153-54 (1984).
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Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he emphasis is on protecting personal rights rather than
on curbing governmental actions. This view toward protecting individual rights as a paramount concern is reflected in a
line of Washington Supreme Court cases[.] ... The important place of the right to privacy in Const. art. I, § 7 seems
to us to require that whenever the
right is unreasonably vio30
lated, the remedy must follow.'

The court has also stated that Article 1, Section 7 "is not
confined to the subjective privacy expectations of modern citizens who, due to well publicized advances in surveillance technology, are learning to expect diminished privacy in many
aspects of their lives."''
While this test formulated by the Washington Supreme
Court has been criticized as a tautology,1 3 2 it provides useful
guideposts for the application of Article 1, Section 7 to the
often complex factual settings of search and seizure issues.
Whereas the Fourth Amendment looks to the subjective
expectation of the individual's privacy, an Article 1, Section 7
analysis focuses on whether, using an objective test, the government acted unreasonably in intruding on the individual's
private affairs.

l3

This difference in focus was determinative in State v.
Boland.'34 The court found in Boland that, although an individual has a lessened expectation of privacy with respect to
trash that was placed at the curb for disposal, the search of the
trash by the police was unconstitutional because it unreasonably invaded the individual's private affairs. 1 35 The court held
the search unconstitutional under Article 1, Section 7 despite
its acknowledgment that the United States Supreme Court
held to the contrary under the Fourth Amendment on the
same issue. 3 6
130. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d at 582, 800 P.2d at 1118 (quoting State v. White, 97
Wash. 2d 92, 110, 640 P.2d 1061, 1071 (1982)) (emphasis in original).
131. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 511, 688 P.2d at 154.
132. Nock, supra note 31, at 345.
133. It has been noted that concepts such as "balancing" and "compelling interest"
were developed by federal courts to deal with federal constitutional provisions, and the
Washington court is entirely free to adopt novel approaches to the same issues. Utter,
Freedom and Diversity, supra note 28, at 506.
134. 115 Wash. 2d 571, 580, 800 P.2d 1112, 1117 (1990).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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The different analysis is of paramount importance with
respect to the issue of drug testing. Recent United States
Supreme Court decisions that allow random suspicionless drug
testing of employees where a compelling government interest
has been demonstrated have largely rested on the finding that
employees have a lessened expectation of privacy by virtue of
working in a safety-sensitive position.13 7 This analysis, however, is inappropriate under the Washington Constitution. An
analysis under Article 1, Section 7 would focus on whether
drug testing unreasonably violates the "private affairs" of the
individual in the objective sense, and not whether the individual has a lowered expectation of privacy. Although it is clear
that the individual's expectation of privacy is not wholly irrelevant under a Washington constitutional analysis, the central
inquiry is whether the intrusion of that person's private affairs
is reasonable.

138

Thus, the distinction between Article 1, Section 7 and the
Fourth Amendment affects the result when the drug testing
issue is constitutionally analyzed. In the workplace, an individual's expectation of privacy might be low.'3 9 However, this
lowered expectation of privacy does not drive state court analysis. Rather it is the reasonableness of the violation of the person's private affairs that is important. As will be discussed, a
urinalysis conducted pursuant to a drug testing program is an
egregious invasion into the private affairs of an individual. 4 °
Despite the grave invasion of privacy, however, the search still
may be held reasonable. This determination turns on whether
the government's interest in the search outweighs the privacy
14
interest under the state constitution.
As previously discussed, there exists a greater right to pri137. See discussion of Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602
(1989), and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989),
supra text accompanying notes 9-26.

138. See, e.g., State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986). The line of
Washington cases that refer to a reasonable expectation of privacy under Article 1,
Section 7 have been criticized as a bastardization of a true independent Washington
State Constitutional analysis, tainted with federal reasoning. See James W. Talbot,
Comment, Rethinking Civil Liberties Under the Washington State Constitution, 66
WASH. L. REV. 1099, 1110-11 (1991).

139. This is especially true in a "safety sensitive" position in which the employee's
job function is directly related to public safety. See supra text accompanying notes 926.
140. See inlfra part III.D.
141. One commentator has stated that the broad privacy protection under the

Washington Constitution "virtually settles that in states such as Washington, random
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vacy under the Washington Constitution than under the
United States Constitution. 14 2 Thus, under the balancing test
to determine whether drug testing is an unreasonable search,
the individual's right of privacy is weighed more heavily.
The recent Washington case of State v. Boland 4 is helpful by way of analogy in determining the extent of the right to
privacy with respect to employee drug testing absent individualized suspicion of drug use. In Boland, the court held that the
defendant's private affairs under Article 1, Section 7 were
unreasonably intruded on by the police when they removed
garbage from his trash can and made it available to narcotic
agents.'" Central to the court's reasoning was the fact that a
search of an individual's trash may reveal much about that person's personal activities, associations, and beliefs through business records, bills, correspondence, magazines, and similar
items.

145

The result is similar with respect to drug testing. Urinalysis can reveal a myriad of medical information that is irrelevant to the purpose of a drug test. 14 6 As Justice Marshall has
stated, "such tests may provide Government officials with a
periscope through which they can peer into an individual's
behavior in her private life, even in her own home. 1 4 7
Another case that is instructive on the Washington
Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of one's private
affairs is Seattle v. Mesiani,48 which held unconstitutional a
sobriety automobile checkpoint program. Mesiani looks at
how the focus on an individual's private affairs under the
Washington Constitution alters search and seizure analysis.
Simply because an industry is pervasively regulated by the government does not deprive an individual within that industry of
his or her privacy interests. Under Article 1, Section 7, unlike
the Fourth Amendment, the proper inquiry is not whether the
drug testing is illegal." Douglas Taylor & Margaret K. Taylor, Random Testing in the
Mass Transit Industry, 12 GEo. MASON U. L. REV. 587, 600 (1990).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 115-22.

143. 115 Wash. 2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990).
144. Id. at 578, 800 P.2d at 1116.
145. Id. (citing State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276-77 (Haw. 1985)).
146. Skinner v.

Railway Labor Executives'

Ass'n,

489 U.S. 602, 649

(1989)

(Marshall, J., dissenting).
147. Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1987), quoted in Skinner, 489
U.S. at 647 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148. 110 Wash. 2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988).

accompanying notes 115-22.

See discussion supra text
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individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy (or whether
that expectation is diminished given a state regulated industry), but rather whether the State unreasonably intruded on
the individual's private affairs.'4 9
Hence, contemporary Article 1, Section 7 analysis provides
a firm foundation to ensure greater protection against
employee drug testing than the current Fourth Amendment
interpretation. First, the Washington Supreme Court has been
particularly circumspect of general, suspicionless searches.
Second, the court has continually held that the Washington
Constitution's focus on the protection of an individual's "private affairs" permits an interpretation of Article 1, Section 7 as
providing protection beyond the Fourth Amendment.
D.

Drug Testing Involves a Grave Invasion of Privacy that
Should be Protected Under Article 1, Section 7

The privacy reference in Article 1, Section 7, and the
heightened protection this privacy is afforded, suggests that
the method of drug testing itself is an invasion of privacy. A
compelled urinalysis impinges on an individual's sense of dignity and autonomy.15s
The privacy issues involved in the administration of an
urinalysis are great. As Justice Marshall has stated: "Urination is among the most private of activities. It is generally forbidden in public, eschewed as a matter of conversation, and
performed in places designed to preserve this tradition of personal seclusion."'15 Furthermore, one commentator has noted
that "in our culture the excretory functions are shielded by
more or less absolute privacy, so much so that situations in
which this privacy is violated are experienced as extremely dis-2
1'
tressing, as detracting from one's dignity and self-esteem."'
The invasion of privacy becomes even more egregious when,
during drug testing, observation is required as a safeguard to
53
protect against employee tampering.
149. See supra text accompanying note 30.
150. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 647 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

151. Id. at 645-46.
152. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 487 (1968).
153. Lower federal courts have held that observation of the act of urination, even
where observation is limited to reasonable suspicion testing, is invalid. See, e.g.,
National Treasury Employees Union v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding
relevant sections of Department of Agriculture regulations invalid); American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees v. Sullivan, 744 F. Supp 294 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding provision of
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The Washington Supreme Court has addressed the issue of
when such "invasions of the body" are permissible in State v.
Curran.'- In Curran,the court held that the forced taking of
a blood sample from a motorist arrested for vehicular homicide
was valid search.15 Under Curran,a blood test may be performed when a person has been killed and the blood test is
authorized by the legislature. 1'
The court added, however,
that "[b]ecause of the special solicitude of article 1, section 7
for the privacy rights of individuals, [it is doubtful] whether
such an invasion of the body would be permissible in less
7
severe circumstances.'

5

Thus, applying the Curran analysis to the issue of drug
testing, employees are protected by the heightened privacy
protection of Article 1, Section 7 against drug testing absent an
individualized suspicion of drug use. The government interest
in testing for drugs (most commonly public safety) should be
given less weight than the stated government interest in Curran. The dangers resulting from employee drug use are only
speculative in nature, whereas in Curran a homicide had
already taken place. Because employee drug use suggests a
"less severe circumstance" than vehicular homicide, suspicionless drug testing is an unjustified bodily invasion that
should be prohibited under Article 1, Section 7.
Random drug testing should be distinguished in this
regard from pre-employment drug testing where an applicant
for employment might be subject to an urinalysis as part of a
required pre-employment physical. Where random drug testing is involved, the taking of a urine sample intrudes on the
employee's work routine. Furthermore, an employee subject
to a random drug test might be the victim of co-worker scrutiny if co-workers assumed that the test was actually based on
suspicion of drug use. That is, despite the fact that all workers
might be equally subject to random testing,15 8 if a particular
individual is tested under "random" testing, fellow employees
Dep't of Health and Human Services regulations invalid). But see Skinner, 489 U.S.

602 (1989) (upholding regulations allowing, but not requiring, observation).
154. 116 Wash. 2d 174, 804 P.2d 558 (1991).
155. Id. at 184, 804 P.2d at 564.
156. Id at 187, 804 P.2d at 565.
157. Id. at 189, 804 P.2d at 566 (Utter, J., concurring).
158. A drug testing scheme will be subject to special scrutiny where the scheme
excludes or includes a disproportionate percentage of individuals in a protected group
under Title VII. See, e.g., New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568

(1979).
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will not be able to ascertain whether the individual was indeed
being tested under a random basis or for cause. As a result,
the individual to be tested suffers an indignity and the invasion
of privacy is more severe.
Another problem with drug testing arises when an
employee is taking a prescription drug that is proscribed under
the employer's drug testing program. Privacy rights would be
implicated in two ways. First, it would force the employee to
disclose to the employer the medication and the purpose for
which it is taken. Second, where an employee must be called
back for testing because of the legitimate prescriptive drug, fellow employees might suspect that the individual is being tested
on a suspicion, and not on a random basis. Such testing might
discourage employees from continuing to take legitimate prescription drugs.
Other important constitutionally protected rights surrounding the right to privacy might be implicated by drug testing as well. For example, the right to procreative choice is a
fundamental right covered by the right of privacy.'5 9 Drug
testing that uncovered a woman's pregnancy or birth control
use would necessarily impinge on her privacy right.
Thus, because Article 1, Section 7 is especially protective
of an individual's privacy right, the highly intrusive nature of a
drug testing procedure is especially relevant to a Washington
constitutional analysis. Searches that constitute "invasions of
the body" have seldom been upheld by the Washington
Supreme Court. A drug-test urinalysis is highly invasive to an
individual's private affairs. As with other invasions of the
body, only in the rarest circumstance should a suspicionless
drug testing program be upheld.' 60
E.

Problems of Under- or Over-Inclusiveness of
Drug Testing Programs

Drug testing programs should be carefully scrutinized
because they may very well be either under- or over-inclusive.161 A program may be under-inclusive if it tests only for
illicit drugs and not for alcohol. Where the public interest
159. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Griswold v. Connecticut,

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
160. See State v. Curran, 116 Wash. 2d 174, 187, 804 P.2d 558, 565 (1991). Such a
search may be appropriate where an accident causing death has occurred.

161. Although the arguments concerning

under- and over-inclusiveness are

germane to both a Fourth Amendment and an Article 1, Section 7 analysis, the
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arguably supporting the program consists principally of safety
(either to the public or to other employees), alcohol abuse
could be just as dangerous in the workplace as drug abuse. In
fact, depending on the industry, alcohol abuse may be more
likely to threaten worker safety than drug abuse. Thus, targeting only illicit drugs, and not alcohol, in an urinalysis would
not be sufficient to fulfill the compelling government interest
of workplace safety. 6 2
A drug testing program may be over-inclusive if the test
would detect drugs that were only residually in the employee's
system but did not have any actual effect on the employee's job
performance. It is a medical fact that many types of illicit
drugs remain in the bloodstream long after entering the body
and may be detected by urinalysis long after the physical
effects of such drugs have worn off.' 3 Thus, a drug testing
program may be impermissibly broad where it would detect
drug use that does not affect job performance.
A drug testing program may also be over-inclusive by not
being narrowly tailored to fit the government interest sought
to be furthered. Where a program indiscriminately affects different employee classes within a given industry, the program
may be too broad in scope. This overbreadth would result if
the different employee classes subject to testing had varying
relationships to the government interest sought to be served by
the testing program. For example, if employees of the Sea-Tac
Airport were subject to a drug testing program and the stated
government interest in testing was public safety, it is clear that
some classes of airport employees work in more safety sensitive jobs than other classes of employees. Air traffic controllers greatly affect public safety. Ground flagspersons have a
lesser effect on safety. Those who drive baggage carts on the
runways may have only a slight effect. Many drug testing programs, however, might not distinguish between those employees who are most directly related to the employer interest and
those who are only remotely related to the employer interest.
arguments are set forth here because they should be cast in the light of heightened
privacy protection granted by the Washington Constitution.
162. This discussion, for purposes of organized discussion, tracks the Fourth
Amendment test to determine whether a search or seizure is reasonable. See supra
text accompanying notes 6-26. However, the Washington court need not analyze the
issues of under- or over-inclusiveness in such a manner if it adopts an independent
interpretation of Article 1, Section 7 with respect to this issue.
163. Mark A. Rothstein, Drug Testing in the Workplace: The Challenge to
Employment Relations and Employment Law, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 683, 695 (1987).
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As such, these programs are over-inclusive if they are not narrowly tailored to fit the interest sought to be furthered.
Another consideration in this regard is whether alternative less intrusive means exist to accomplish the government
purpose. An important inquiry is whether, if the drug abuse
was sufficiently severe to significantly affect job performance,
it is possible to detect the drug abuse by less intrusive
means. 164 Greater on the job surveillance of workers might
effect the same purpose as drug testing. Although closer
supervision might be less cost effective to the employer than
drug testing, the privacy rights of employees cannot be measured on such a scale.
Another alternative manner to safeguard the workplace
from the influence of drugs is education. Although by no
means a perfect method of preventing all drug related
problems, a clear policy concerning drug use at the workplace
and the use of seminars and other educative tools would be
helpful in eradicating the problem. Allowing an employer to
indiscriminately drug test would have the adverse affect of
providing a disincentive to employers to educate employees of
drug abuse because employers could eradicate the problem of
drug use through the less costly method of testing. Hence,
while drug testing programs might "clean up" the workplace,
they might also detract from curing the underlying social problem of drug abuse.
Finally, mandatory employee drug testing is permissible
under the Washington Constitution if it is based on employee
consent. It is settled law that an individual can waive her privacy rights under Article 1, Section 71' Thus, employees can
waive their right of privacy against drug tests at the bargaining
table. Either individually or through collective bargaining, an
employer can buy the right to test its employees.
In summary, through either closer monitoring, education,
or collective bargaining, there exist alternative means for the
employer to accomplish the goals served by a drug testing program. Given that a urinalysis is a grave invasion of privacy,
a court should weigh heavily these possible alternatives to
ensure that there exists no reasonable less inhibitive means of
effecting the government interest sought to be furthered by
164. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 682
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. See State v. Smith, 72 Wash. 2d 479, 481, 434 P.2d 5, 7 (1967).
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the drug testing program. If reasonable alternative means
exist, the drug testing program should be held
unconstitutional.
IV.

HOLDINGS OF OTHER STATES

Although clearly not binding on the Washington Supreme
Court, decisons from other states can serve as guideposts as to
how the Washington constitutional provisions should be interpreted.1 6 The most important sister states in this analysis
would be those who have constitutional provisions similar to
Article 1, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution.1 7 Unfortunately, the state whose constitution was the primary textual
source of Article 1, Section 7, Oregon," has yet to confront
the issue of drug testing absent a basis of individualized suspicion of drug use. Thus, the Washington Supreme Court must
look elsewhere to find analogous state cases addressing this
issue.
A comparison of how other state courts have handled this
issue is inconclusive. Some states, such as California, have
held that the relevant state constitutional provision affords
protection to employees against drug testing.169 The interpretation of California's Constitution is of little assistance to an
interpretation of Washington's Constitution because the state
constitutional right to privacy guaranteed by Article 1, Section
1 of the California Constitution protects citizens against both
governmental and non-governmental conduct, and it places a
heavier burden on the proponent of a privacy invasion than
70
does the Fourth Amendment.
166. State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 577, 800 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1990). See Utter &
Pitler, Presentinga Constitutional Argument, supra note 64, at 640-45.
167. See Utter & Pitler, Presenting a Constitutional Argument, supra note 64, at

672-76.
168. 1889 JOURNAL, supra note 56, at 497 n.13; OR. CONST. art. 1, § 9.

169. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that student athletes at private university could not be required to
submit to drug testing by the National Collegiate Athletic Association, a private

unincorporated association); Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that employee, who held a position not implicating public
safety, could refuse a random drug test conducted by a private employer because,
under CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1, employer did not demonstrate a compelling interest to
overcome the plaintiff's privacy right); but see Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264
Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that private publishing company could test

employees as part of a pre-employment screening).
170. Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
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1 72
71
Louisiana,171
Other states, such as Alaska,1 Hawaii,
and West Virginia, 7 4 have held to the contrary. It is not surprising that Hawaii has interpreted its constitution as allowing
the Honolulu Police Department to conduct random drug testing because Article 1, Section 6 of the Hawaii Constitution contains an express limitation to the right of privacy where there
is a showing of a "compelling state interest.' 1 75 Furthermore,
Hawaii's constitutional search and seizure provision is similar
to the Fourth Amendment. 176 Indeed, the Hawaii court cites
extensively to United States Supreme Court precedents in
Skinner and Von Raab. But reliance on federal precedent in
this area would be less appropriate for a state such as Washington, which employs radically different wording in its provision.
Other states whose courts have decided both ways on the
77
issue given different factual settings include Massachusetts,
171. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989) (upholding
upheld drug testing only with respect to private employers; state action required to
invoke the protection of ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22 right to privacy).
172. McCloskey v. Honolulu Police Dep't, 799 P.2d 953 (Haw. 1990). In this case,
the Hawaii State Supreme Court found that a City of Honolulu drug testing program,
which included random drug testing, did not violate either the privacy provision,
Article 1, Section 6 of the Hawaii Constitution, id. at 957, or the state constitutional
protection against unlawful search and seizure, Article 1, Section 7. Id. at 959. The
court held that the testing program passed strict scrutiny analysis under Article 1,
Section 6 because the program was necessary and the least restrictive means to satisfy
the legitimate government interests of ensuring safety to individual police officers and
the public, and preserving the department's integrity. Id. at 958.
173. In Holthus v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 580 So. 2d 469 (La. Ct. App.
1991), the court held that, although the right of privacy under Article 1, Section 5 of
the Louisiana Constitution is broader than the protection against unreasonable search
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the random testing of race track employees
was not prohibited by the Louisiana Constitution. Id. at 471.
174. In Twigg v. Hercules Corp., 406 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 1990), the court held that
drug testing by a private employer does not violate state public policy where the
employee's job responsibility involves public safety or safety of others. Id. at 55. The
court dealt with the applicability of privacy rights under W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 6 only
in dictum, however, and made no attempt to distinguish this state provision from the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 56.
175. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
176. Id.
177. In O'Connor v. Police Comm'n of Boston, 557 N.E.2d 1146 (Mass. 1990), the
court held that a police cadet's rights under the state prohibition of unlawful search
and seizure, Article 14 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution,
were not violated when he was discharged after testing positive for cocaine, because
the state interest in public safety and the integrity of the police force made the search
reasonable and because the cadet signed a consent form before beginning employment.
Id. at 1150-51. However, it should be noted that the court adopted federal precedent in
Skinner and Von Raab, see supra text accompanying notes 9-26, and did not embark
on any independent interpretation of the Massachusetts Constitution. Id. at 1149.
Furthermore, only four of the seven judges sitting ruled that the search did not violate
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New Jersey, 7 ' and New York.'7 9 Courts that held drug testing
unconstitutional generally concluded that there was no strong
public safety interest' s or that there was a lack of reasonable
suspicion.81 In many of these cases, it is uncertain whether
the respective court truly relied on an independent state constitutional analysis or on established federal precedent. Hence,
the precedent of other state courts concerning drug testing is
of little help to the Washington Supreme Court in its interpretation of Article 1, Section 7.
V.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, there is a firm basis for the Washington
Supreme Court to construe Article 1, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution to provide greater protection to employees
against employer drug testing without grounds of individualized suspicion of drug use than the current interpretation of
Article 14; the remaining three judges concurred in judgment, but did so on the basis
of consent and the probationary status of a police cadet, and disagreed concerning the
balancing test, believing that a sufficient public interest did not exist. Id. at 1152.
In Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. State Racing Comm'n, 532
N.E.2d 644 (Mass. 1989), the court held that the state racing commission's random drug
testing of licensees was unconstitutional under Article 14 because the regulation was
not sufficiently linked to a legitimate concern of public safety. Id. at 652.
178. In International Fed'n of Professional & Technical Eng'rs, Local 194A, AFL/
CIO-CLC v. Burlington County Bridge Comm'n, 572 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1990), the court held that public employees whose work included opening and
closing bridges across the Delaware River could be subjected to non-random drug
testing as a part of an annual physical examination because the New Jersey
Constitution does not afford greater rights with respect to this issue than those found
in the U.S. Constitution under Skinner. Id. at 212. It is important to note in this
regard that the language of the New Jersey and the federal provisions is identical.
Burlington County Bridge Comm'n, 572 A. 2d at 212.
In Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 524 A.2d
430 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987), the court held that random testing of police
officers violated Article 1, Section 7 of the New Jersey Constitution prohibiting
unlawful search and seizure because the testing program did not fit within any special
exception to the warrant requirement, nor did it pass the test of reasonableness. In
particular, there was no showing of past problems of drug use on the police force or
incidents involving drug use that posed a threat to public safety. Id. at 437-38.
179. Ritterband v. Axelrod, 562 N.Y.S.2d 605, 610-11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (holding
that suspicionless blood testing of hospital personnel for rubella did not constitute an
unlawful search and seizure or violate the employees' right to privacy); Wilder v.
Koehler, 556 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding that correctional officer's
rights under N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 12 and the Fourth Amendment were violated when
she was fired for refusing to submit to a drug test without the presence of reasonable
suspicion).
180. Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12, 524 A.2d at 437-38;
Horeseman's Benevolent and Protective Ass'n, 532 N.E.2d at 652.
181. Wilder, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
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the Fourth Amendment. The issue of protection under Article
1, Section 7 against drug testing is particularly appropriate for
an independent state constitutional analysis because the constitutional history of Article 1, Section 7 reveals a strong desire
of the framers to protect the rights of citizens, and particularly
labor, against government and industry. Also, sound precedent
exists in Washington that supports a broader right of privacy
under the Washington Constitution than the federal
Constitution.
It is also clear that a urinalysis conducted pursuant to a
drug test is a private affair protected by Article 1, Section 7,
and that a general search, conducted without a basis of individualized suspicion, is seldom tolerated by the Washington
Supreme Court. General speculation concerning the promotion of public safety has seldom been held to be a sufficient
government interest to justify an invasion into a citizen's private affairs. To the contrary, an invasion of the body, such as a
drug test urinalysis, is a grave invasion of an individual's
autonomy that the Washington Supreme Court has said merits
diligent constitutional protection.
It is not the intent of this Comment to define the detailed
contours of the scope of protection of Article 1, Section 7 from
drug testing. The possible permutations of facts concerning
such variables as pre-employment, post-employment, or postaccident testing, visual and aural monitoring, over- and underinclusiveness, prior history of problems in the industry, and
the various government interests ostensibly served by testing
are better left to a case by case analysis. Rather, the central
purpose of this Comment is to show that the history of Article
1, Section 7, as well as an analysis of contemporary case law
and public policy concerns, support an interpretation of Article
1, Section 7 that would provide greater protection than the
Fourth Amendment to employees against drug testing absent
an individualized suspicion of drug use.
This issue has yet to be addressed by the Washington
Supreme Court. With the proliferation of drug testing programs increasingly impinging on the rights of Washington citizens, however, the time is ripe for the court to address this
issue. Instead of attempting to rely on the ever vacillating
weather vane of the United States Supreme Court, the Washington Supreme Court will have the opportunity to set out on
its own path of analysis based solely on the Washington Consti-
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tution. As Justice Marshall has stated: "(A]cceptance of dragnet blood and urine testing ensures that the first, and worst,
casualty of the war on drugs will be the precious liberties of
our citizens."" 2 There is clear ground under Washington Constitution Article 1, Section 7 for the Washington Supreme
Court to secure the continuance of these liberties for Washington citizens.

182. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 636 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).

